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### K – Sharma – 1NC

#### Discourse of Nativeness turns all defined outside the nation into colonizers – this separation justifies genocide.

Sharma ’20 [Nandita; Professor of Sociology @ University of Hawaii – Manoa, PhD in Sociology and Equity Studies @ University of Toronto; “The National Politics of Separation” in *Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants*, Duke University Press, p. 1-35; AS]

National Autochthonies

National autochthonous discourses are a legacy of imperialism. Having constructed a Manichean binary of European/Native, fearful imperial states, beginning with the British Empire’s containment of the Indian Rebellion of 1857, regained control by separating colonized Natives into two, supposedly distinct, groups: “Indigenous-Natives” and “Migrant-Natives,” with the former regarded as more native than the latter (Mamdani 2012). The basis of this imperial distinction was the idea that a primordial relationship existed between a certain group of people and a designated place. Indigenous-Natives, not unlike certain flora and fauna, were portrayed as being “of the place,” further naturing them in the process. Migrant-Natives, on the other hand, were portrayed as being subsequent settlers from outside the colony and therefore not of it.

Both categories were codified in imperial law so that the two categories of colonized Natives were governed by dif­ferent laws. These laws, which included differential allocations of land, political rights, and power for people in the two groups, materialized the differences between Indigenous-Natives and Migrant-Natives. Indigenous-Natives were granted formal access to territories and political rights on it through “Native authorities.” Migrant-Natives were not. Such imperial distinctions profoundly reshaped politics in the colonies and informed how national liberation movements imagined which people were the People of the nation. Nationalists took the imperial idea of indigeneity as a stable and static group and retooled it to fit the nations they were in the process of creating. With “independence,” the imperialist meanings attached to both Natives and Migrants were relocated to nationalized territory. When the colonies and, later, imperial metropoles nationalized their sovereignties from the late nineteenth century, claims to national status were underpinned by claims to autochthonous belonging. Being Native, once the denigrated Other to the colonizer, has, in the Postcolonial New World Order, become the quintessential criterion for being a member of the nation. Migrants, unable to cross the racialized boundary of Nativeness (at least in the places they actually live) and unable to organize themselves into a nation, remain “out of place.”

Placing people into separated categories of National-Natives and Migrants is no trifling matter. People’s relationship to nation-states, to national political bodies, and to one another are organized by the rights associated with the category people find themselves in. Across the world system of nation-states, a further contraction of the already limited criteria of national belonging has taken place around the figure of the National-Native. At the same time, an expansion of the term “colonizer” has occurred, one that encompasses all those seen to be Migrants. Borrowing the imperial meaning of Natives as colonized people, National-Natives see themselves as “colonized” by Migrants. In turn, Migrants’ own experience of colonization is seen as unimportant—and unpolitical. Instead Migrants are demonized as destroyers of nations.

Today, national autochthony is increasingly important to nationalist projects, both from above and from below. Most troubling, the legal and/or social separation of National-Natives and Migrants animates deadly conflicts around the world. A particularly stark example of this is taking place in Myanmar (formerly Burma), where the separation of National-Natives and Migrants is the basis for what has been termed the world’s most recent genocide, this time against Rohingya people (International State Crime Initiative, Queen Mary University of London, 2015). Nation-state officials and popular Buddhist monks categorize (mostly) Muslim Rohingya people as “illegal Bengali migrants” and argue that expelling them from both the nation and its sovereign territory is necessary for the defense of national society (see Foucault 1978, 137; Foucault 2003). Over the past four decades, Rohingya people have had their homes and property destroyed; they have been tortured, killed, and placed in camps; their citizenship has been removed; and a growing number have been forced to flee. Having already been socially constituted as Migrants, many have been made Migrants both in national law and in everyday life.

Treating Rohingya people as deportable people without rights, Myanmar has constructed approximately sixty-seven camps and moved about 140,000 Rohingya people into them since 2012. Many observers regard these camps as nothing less than concentration camps (Motlagh 2014; Fortify Rights 2015; Kristof 2016). Since 2015, violence against Rohingya people has intensified further. From late August 2017 to January 2018, two-thirds of all Rohingya people in Myanmar—an estimated 688,000 people—fled to Bangladesh to escape attacks from Myanmar’s military (see Ibrahim 2018; unhcr 2018). Bangladesh, meanwhile, is trying to force them “home.” Rohingya people are thus simultaneously victims of both the hardening criteria for national citizenship in Myanmar and the intensification of national immigration controls in Bangladesh and other nation-states, which try to deny them a new life elsewhere. Made stateless, Rohingya people have thus been made subject to the coercive power of all nation-states.

Another stark example of the political work done by separating NationalNatives from Migrants is the popular “Save Darfur” movement, which has successfully reframed the economic, political, and ecological legacies of European imperialism in the Darfur region of Sudan as a racialized conflict between “Black African” National-Natives and “light-skinned Arab” Migrants. Playing directly into the hands of oil companies, this division has further fueled the Islamophobic U.S.-led war on terror in the region. Probably the best-studied example of the violence ensuing from the separation of National-Natives and Migrants is the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, when those acting in the name of Hutus killed approximately 800,000 Tutsis and those Hutus who opposed this mass murder. Such state-organized killings were evident at least as far back as the first murderous attacks against Tutsis by Hutus in the lead-up to Rwanda’s 1961 declaration of national independence. From that time on, the self-identification of Hutus as the National-Natives of Rwanda and the categorization of Tutsis as colonizing Migrants was consistently used to violently expunge Tutsis from the national political body.

A not dissimilar process took place in the 1991–2002 Yugoslav Wars. Ideas of National-Native belonging fueled the claims to Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Bosnian homelands. In each national territory, people targeted for “ethnic cleansing” were said to be Migrants and thus foreign elements in the national homelands of others. A total of 140,000 people were killed, with another two million people displaced. In Myanmar, Sudan, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, women’s bodies were abstracted as national symbols. Consequently, rape was a major weapon of war used to define national populations (Chinkin 1994; Agamben 1998; Kesic 2002). No one was spared. Combatants on all sides targeted women for either being Native to the enemy or being the Migrant enemy.

These are only some of the better reported—and most murderous— events where the politics of separating National-Natives from Migrants has been central. Organized through a politics of autochthony, each has employed the politics of home rule to exclude, expel, and even to systematically exterminate those constituted as Migrants. However, autochthonous politics have also been the prime basis for the indigenization of numerous African states, such as Idi Amin’s forced expulsion of “Asians” from Uganda in 1972; they are also fundamental to military coup d’états unseating democratically elected “Asian” parliamentary leaders in Fiji; and they are at the core of moral panics over “Migrant invasions” across Europe.

#### Analytic of settler colonialism demonizes migration and mobility. Their paradigm repeats the blood and soil logic of colonial nationalism and sovereignty.

Nandita **SHARMA** Social Sciences @ York **‘15** “Strategic Anti- Essentialism: Decolonizing Decolonization” in *Sylvia Wynter: Being Human as Praxis* p. 170-174

Subjected: Autochthony and Its Others

The very real possibility of thinking and acting outside the limits of any specific culture’s self- understanding by expanding people’s sense of nos is evident in countless attempts over the past five hundred years to broaden the circle of those with whom we hold affective ties. Significantly, this is a process that has been engaged in both by dominant groups and by those they rule over. To use an example given by Wynter, while the Aztecs in the early sixteenth century were unable to imagine others living in what is now “Mexico” as their co- specifics—and thereby enabling Hernán Cortés to successfully ally himself with other groups to destroy the Aztecs—there now exists a subjective understanding of being “indigenous.”

Emerging in the post–World War II era, indigeneity is a relatively recent mode of representation, one that encompasses very diverse people across the Americas, indeed across the world, often under a single, shared subjective understanding of being the “first” to live in any particular place.22 Being indigenous is a form of co- identification among people who previously did not see any connection with one another. It is also a way of laying claim to particular lands (or, more accurately, territories) on the basis of having (or having once had) specialized knowledge of that place. Yet, this mode of representation, however new or potentially expansive, remains particularistic.

Indigeneity is a form of subjectivity that emerged because of the devastation wrought in the aftermath of 1492. Moreover, it is a form of subjectivity that interpellates people into efforts to gain national sovereignty within the global system of national states. Indigenous, then, as a mode of representation includes the often unacknowledged elision between native as a colonial state category of subjugation and indigenous as a category of resistance. Indigenous conceptualized as such retains two interrelated problems that ensure that the kinds of unequal relationships organized in the aftermath of 1492 are reproduced. First, by denying the social constitution of the category of indigenous, it disavows people’s now- long history of connectivity across (and sometimes against) this category. Because this connectivity challenges the particularistic nature of indigeneity, recognition of interrelationality is itself represented as a threat. Second, by continuing to limit the criteria of membership of each nos, each is unable to accept as co- specifics those who are rendered as always- already oppositional others. Indeed, in making any particularistic nos, the significance of omitting certain others cannot be underestimated.

The category of indigenous, thus, does a sort of political work. It produces a particular nos (and thus a particular Other- to- indigenous nos).23 For some (though certainly not all) of those currently constituted as indigenous, it seems that one of the consequences of the enormously uneven Columbian exchange is the denunciation of the process of exchange itself. Today, the movement of life, plants, humans, and other animals is often cited as the cause for the devastation wrought on their native equivalent.24 Rather than focus on the hierarchical and exploitative relations of the Columbian exchange, some assume that the cause of the problem was / is mobility itself. Within such a worldview, that which moves is consequently denounced as inherently polluting, and, in an idiom that is gaining in popularity, movement and migration are posited as inherently colonizing.

An understanding of mobility as always colonizing is evident in the expansion of the term “settler colonist” to include all those deemed nonnative in any given space. Recently, within both indigenous studies and social movements for indigenous rights, the historical distinctions between the voyages of Columbus (and other colonizers) and those of slaves who survived the Middle Passage, indentured workers recruited in the wake of slavery’s abolition, and present- day migrants captured in a variety of state categories ranging from illegal to immigrant, have been collapsed. All, it is claimed, are agents of colonialism. It seems, then, that as there has been an expansion in the subjective understanding of people as indigenous, there has been a subsequent expansion in their other. Put differently, within some indigenous systems of belonging, all past and present people constituted as migrants are situated as colonizers.

In our present “great age” of migration, how did “colonizer” become a meaningful way to describe people who move across space?25 Indeed, how did “colonizer” come to be an increasingly dominant mode of representing indigenous people’s others, others who were once understood as cocolonized people or, at least, not as an oppositional other? Is there a relationship between these particularistic modes of representation and the false separation and hierarchical ranking of different but related experiences of colonization, such as the processes of expropriation and people’s displacement across space?

The answers to these questions lie within the logics of autochthonous systems of representation and the ways in which **claims to indigeneity bring to life discourses of alienness or foreignness**. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff argue, by “elevating to a first- principle the ineffable interests and connections, at once material and moral, that flow from ‘native’ rootedness, and special rights, in a place of birth,” autochthonous discourses place those constituted as natives at the top of a hierarchy of the exploited, oppressed, and colonized and insist on the centrality of the claims of natives for the realization of either decolonization or justice.26 Within the negative duality of natives and nonnatives that such discourses put into play, origins (and, in some contexts, claims of original, versus later, human discovery or inhabitation) become the key determinant of who belongs in any given space today—and who does not.

The quintessential alien or foreigner within autochthonous discourses is the figure of the migrant. This is because the hegemonic understanding of what it means to be a migrant in today’s world is one where migration is seen as movement away from one’s native land. Thus, migrants come to stand as the ultimate nonnative. Such a move works to shift the focus from a dialectics of colonialism—where the key historical dynamic is one of expropriation and exploitation, and the key relationship is one between the colonizers and the colonized—to one where the dichotomy between native and nonnative becomes central to both analysis and politics. Patrick Wolfe, a historian of Australia, captures this perspective well in his claim that “the fundamental social divide is not the color line. It is not ethnicity, minority status, or even class. The primary line is the one distinguishing Natives from settlers—that is, from everyone else. Only the Native is not a settler. Only the Native is truly local. Only the Native will free the Native. One is either native or not.”27 From such an autochthonous perspective, being native is both spatially and temporally dependent. Temporally, migrants may be identified as natives at some point in time and in some given space, but once having moved away from the spaces where such representations may be claimed, they become nonnatives. Spatially, migrants remain native but only to the places they no longer live in. Thus, some argue that migrants can continue to claim native rights to places they have moved from if they are able to show genealogical descendance from those with native status in that space.28 Candace Fujikane, in dismissing Asian claims to belong in the United States, puts it this way: “Indigenous people are differentiated from settlers by their genealogical, familial relationship with specific land bases that are ancestors to them. One is either indigenous to a particular land base or one is not. Asian Americans are undeniably settlers in the United States because we cannot claim any genealogy to the land we occupy, no matter how many lifetimes Asian settlers work on the land, or how many Asian immigrants have been killed through racist persecution and hate crimes, or how brutal the political or colonial regimes that occasioned Asians’ exodus from their homelands.”29 In this logic, indigeneity is racialized / ethnicized, and in the process, land—or more accurately, territory—is as well. Natives, it is assumed, belong in “their” native land and only there. Further, who can be recognized as native is dependent upon ancestry, thereby adding blood to the discourse of soil. Descent becomes of further importance in this distinction, for many indigenous people are, of course, also Asian (and European and African and so on) as well as vice versa. It is one’s ability to claim some indigenous ancestor that can allow one to be seen as indigenous today. While such claims can be social and not biological, many indigenous groups, following from certain governments’ own categorical recognition of indigeneity, rely on some form of blood quantum rule that requires a minimal indigenous lineage. Not surprisingly, such criteria for belonging (and for the rights and entitlements of membership) have not always worked for those subordinated through other axes of oppression and exploitation. Thus, many women have found that their claims to native status are often the first to be discounted.30

In this, there is an ironic historical continuity of autochthonous ideas and practices of belonging and the underlying logics of the colonial (and, in some places, postcolonial) state. Indeed, the meaning of native was one that was used to distinguish the colonized from the colonizer so that the natives could be represented as less human and, therefore, as legitimately colonized. Being native, then, was a signifier of being colonized and the ultimate signifier of abjectness. Nativeness as a mode of representation, then, was designed to institutionalize the new racist orders implemented by different colonial empires. Importantly, all colonized people were variously identified as “the” natives in

**Anti-migrant frames produce a global apartheid against labor. Demonization of migrants mobilizes national populations for war and repressive immigration control.**

Nandita **SHARMA** Social Sciences @ York **‘5** “Anti-Trafficking Rhetoric and the Making of a Global Apartheid” *NWSA Journal* 17.3 p. 88-90

In contemporary discourses of national security, it is the eradication of the "dangerous foreigner" that is paramount to notions of protecting the "homeland." This demands of "us," the nation's subjects, that "we" be vigilant against "outsiders" seeking increasingly clever ways to circumvent national border controls and thereby usurp the authority and integrity of the nation-state. Such rhetoric is, of course, readily apparent in the post-September 11 war on terror with its widespread practice of nationalized, racialized, and gendered profiling of security threats. Yet, it is important to remind ourselves that such national security agendas have long been in place. Remembering this may allow us to better understand how legitimation for this latest war is organized. In this paper I investigate how national and international governance regimes together shape the experiences of migrants exiting, moving in between, and resettling into various nationalized societies, and how increasingly these regimes rely on the trope of "homeland security" to police the bodies of the majority of the world's migrants (Balibar 1991, 90).

Such an investigation is crucial in light of the global system of apartheid that is firmly in place-a system that celebrates the mobility of capital and some bodies, while the bodies of others face ever-growing restrictions and criminalization. Today's system of global apartheid has been put together in part through the United Nations (UN), which increasingly regulates the global mobilities of (some) people, as well as through the universally legitimate ideological practice of nationalism. The underlying principle of "national sovereignty" embedded within the original U N mandate enables nation-states to legally, and with little, if any, outcry discriminate against those who can be cast as the nation's "others."

This article examines one increasingly important, and increasingly obfuscated aspect of the national and international security agenda-that of anti-trafficking campaigns directed, in particular, at controlling the migration of women and children. I argue that anti-trafficking practices operate as a moral panic that simultaneously obscure the vulnerability of migrant women in the nexus of state and capitalist practices while representing them as victims solely of traffickers. This moral panic serves to legitimize increasingly regressive state practices of immigration control. These controls, in turn, form the basis for the construction and maintenance of a global apartheid whereby differential legal regimes are organized within nationalized space: one for "citizens" and another far more regressive one for those, such as people categorized as "illegal," who are denied a permanent legal status within the nation space. The ideological frame of anti-trafficking minimizes and often makes migrants as displaced people completely invisible. The ideology of antitrafficking does not recognize that migrants have been displaced by practices that have resulted in the loss of their land and/or livelihoods through international trade liberalization policies, mega-development projects, the loss of employment in capitalist labor markets, or war. Not only does the frame of anti-trafficking lead to a suspicion of women's (and children's) migrations so that it is only ever seen as crisis-producing instead of life-saving, it further renders as unseeable the reasons why migrants are forced to make clandestine movements, usually with the help of people who know how to get them across national borders undetected.

**We should reject their dualistic understanding of native and migrant. Territorialized subjectivity denies our potential ecological and symbolic connections.**

Nandita **SHARMA** Social Sciences @ York **‘15** “Strategic Anti- Essentialism: Decolonizing Decolonization” in *Sylvia Wynter: Being Human as Praxis* p. 164-167

In short, much has changed since Columbus’s initial voyage. While this may seem far too obvious or even trite to say, it is, nonetheless, a point that is often forgotten, even disavowed, by those Wynter describes as falling on either side of a dualism of “celebrants” and “dissidents” of the events of 1492.3 Celebrants see in the Columbian exchange only a “glorious achievement,” while dissidents see in it only an unending disaster. Paradoxically, though focused on the consequences of 1492, both celebrants and dissidents presume that the exchange did not irrevocably change the lives—and futures—of everyone concerned. This is, in part, due to the disconnected or, as Wynter puts it, particularistic, sense of the “we” that both celebrants and dissidents recognize themselves as belonging to. Each particularistic “we” is racialized, ethnicized, and, increasingly, nationalized. Celebrants in the United States, for example, continue to imagine the nation as a simple extension of a “European” or “White” society as if this is actually so, while dissidents imagine native societies as if the category of native was not, itself, borne from a colonizing desire for power and the strategic need to foster hierarchical difference. Both celebrants and dissidents refuse to acknowledge that something other than either glory or devastation was also wrought from the events following 1492, something that can possibly point to ways of being connected to one another as humans without the hierarchies and homogenizations developed in the process of the Columbian exchange.

Wynter argues for another way of analyzing the making of a new world, one that recognizes its horrors, its newness, and its potentialities. Her “new world view” is a recognition of the **transversal character** of the Columbian exchange, a recognition that invites people to deviate from the hierarchicalizing and homogenizing “accumulation of differences” emblematic of Columbus’s own limited view of the new world he helped to bring into being.4 In rejecting the dualism advanced by celebrants and dissidents, Wynter asks whether “a new and ecumenically human view” of the events following 1492 can emerge, one that expands our sense of who “we” are, one that will allow us to co- identify and coexist as interaltruistic co- humans.5 This “new world view,” she argues, is one that most closely reflects our actually, already existing interrelationality, a **form of connectivity** to each other that has long manifested itself **ecologically** as well as “**sociosystemically**.”6 Indeed, Wynter believes that our new world, precisely because of the exchanges that brought it into existence, has given us the option to form new social relationships with one another based on our shared humanity. Subjectively aligning ourselves through **nonhierarchical** relations of **co- specificity**, Wynter argues, is **ethically** “the **only possible commemoration** of 1492.”7

In this essay, I begin with an examination of Sylvia Wynter’s argument regarding what she, after Robert Pirsig, calls Columbus’s “root expansion of thought.”8 Columbus’s challenge to the prevailing Christian views of his time concerning the earth’s geography and its habitability, she shows, allowed him to expand then- existing ideas of humanity. For Columbus, all of humanity was—or could / must be made to be—part of the (still very much Christian) fold. Such an expansion in the meaning of the propter nos—the “us” for whom the world exists—if taken to its fullest potential and denuded of its hierarchical rankings can provide us, Wynter maintains, with the cognitive framework to end the most nefarious effects of the initial Columbian exchange.

I follow by examining some of the ways in which we have, so far, been mostly unable to recognize either that a new world was indeed forged in the aftermath of 1492 or that this new world has provided us with potential escape routes away from its devastating consequences. The failure to take up the possibilities of this new world is, perhaps, most clearly evident in recent efforts to posit a Manichaean relationship of people and place where one is either native or not. In this simultaneously expanding and narrowing dualism of belonging, it is all those who are constituted as migrants who are said to colonize those constituted as natives. I show how this **deep hostility** toward mobility is one of the more **nefarious outcomes** of the unevenness of the Columbian exchange. It is a view that refuses to see persons constituted into putative groupings of natives and migrants as coexisting in a shared field of colonial (and now postcolonial) power. Situating my discussion in the Americas, I argue that to undo this dualism, we need to take the **necessary step** of bringing **both natives and migrants** into the **same field of analysis**.9 I conclude with a discussion of how efforts to expand our sense of co- specificity have always coexisted alongside efforts to narrow them so that we can see that espousing particularistic senses of “we” is only one choice among many, a choice that we can and, I would argue, we should reject. The basis of the rejection of a particularistic propter nos rests, I believe, on a rejection of **territorialized** **senses** of **self** and, thus, **other**. Part of the consequence of expanding capitalist social property relations to the Americas (which began in earnest in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries) was the territorialization of land, place, subjectivity, and belonging. Control over land and control over a sense of place and who “belonged” there and who did not were absolutely crucial to gaining control over people.10 This process of territorialization was significant in the ushering in of a “new world order” of both constituting and partitioning putative “races,” genders, and later “nations,” and later natives and “migrants.”

### K – West Essentialism – 1NC

#### The aff’s totalizing narrative of colonialism and anti-colonialism commits us to a *total* revolution. The structure of the characters and plot of anti-colonialism remains trapped in a desire for the politics of *self-determination* and *self-definition* as the answer to domination.

David **SCOTT** Anthropology @ Columbia **‘4** *Conscripts of Modernity* p. 2-8

SOME YEARS AGO I published a book, Refashioning Futures, in which I sought to sketch out some of my disquiet about the ways in which colonialism was being constructed and theorized as a conceptual problem for. postcolonial present. That disquiet had several interconnected dimensions, but one of them - one upon which I want to fasten our attention in this book, Conscripts of Modernity- had to do with the assumptions made about the present in relation to which pasts are reconstructed and represented for contemporary inquiry. We are all, after Michel Foucault, historians of the present, but it seemed to me that very little systematic consideration, if any, was being given to what present it is that the past was being reimagined for. Of course, the rationale for the postcolonial reinterrogation and recharacterization of the colonial past (which began in earnest in the 198os, at least in the North Atlantic academy) has rightly been that it will enable some critical purchase on the present. But what present was this supposed to be that the past was being called upon to illuminate, and, moreover, in relation to what prospect-what hope what expectation? In the conceptual reorientation that has characterized the intervention of postcolonial theory over the past two decades, the precise nature of the relation between pasts, presents, and futures has rarely ever been specified and conceptually problematized. It has tended, rather, to be assumed, to be taken for granted. Postcolonial theorists have made a considerable name for themselves by criticizing their predecessors, the anticolonial nationalists, for their essentialism- that is, for holding conceptions of nation, race, identity, history, and so on that assume (in the well-known phrase) a metaphysics of presence, a stable ground of explication and justification. It has been easy for these theorists, armed with social constructionism, to demonstrate the error in these conceptions and to appear in turn to hold more theoretically sophisticated understandings of the past and its relation to the present.4 I have never entirely disagreed with this postcolonial dissatisfaction (nor with the attitude of hermeneutical suspicion with which it is articulated), but my worry has been that in adopting this kind of critical approach postcolonial theorists have often unwittingly made an essentialist mistake of their own. These critics have sometimes assumed that the questions to which the anticolonial nationalists addressed themselves - questions about their presents and their connection to their pasts and their hoped-for futures - were the same as the ones that organize their own contemporary concerns and preoccupations. The postcolonial assumption, in other words, has often been that the anticolonial nationalists merely had bad (i.e., essentialist or metaphysical) answers to good (or anyway, standardly formulated) questions. This is what I think is mistaken; it has appeared to me to be but another version of the essentialism they have so incisively criticized. In this instance, the metaphysics of antiessentialism has been to assume that it is postcolonial answers-rather than postcolonial questions - that require historicization, deconstruction, and reformulation. My view is precisely the reverse of this: it is our postcolonial questions and not our answers that demand our critical attention. In my view, an adequate interrogation of the present (postcolonial or otherwise) depends upon identifying the difference between the questions that animated former presents and those that animate our own. In spelling out this disquiet I have sought to elaborate a conception of the temporality of what I call "problem-spaces." This is a concept that will also be central to this book's concerns, and it will be helpful, therefore, to say again what I mean by it, why I find it handy, and what I mean it to do. 5 A "problem-space," in my usage, is meant first of all to demarcate a discursive context, a context of language. But it is more than a cognitively intelligible arrangement of concepts, ideas, images, meanings, and so on-though it is certainly this. It is a context of argument and, therefore, one of intervention. A problem-space, in other words, is an ensemble of questions and answers around which a horizon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as well as ideological-political stakes) hangs. That is to say, what defines this discursive context are not only the particular problems that get posed as problems as such (the problem of "race," say), but the particular questions that seem worth asking and the kinds of answers that seem worth having. Notice, then, that a problem space is very much a context of dispute, a context of rival views, a context, if you like, of knowledge and power. But from within the terms of any given problem-space what is in dispute, what the argument is effectively about, is not itself being argued over. Notice also that a problem space necessarily has a temporal dimension or, rather, is a fundamentally temporal concept. Problem-spaces alter historically because problems are not -timeless and do not have everlasting shapes. In new historical conditions old questions may lose their salience, their bite, and so lead the range of old answers that once attached to them to appear lifeless, quaint, not so much wrong as irrelevant. In such conditions the old paths between questions and answers do not necessarily disappear; their cognitive connections may remain visible and intelligible as the norm or the convention, but the paths now go nowhere because the stakes involved in walking them have dissolved. This is why for me the idea of a problem space is connected to the idea that criticism has always to be strategic inasmuch as in judging its purchase criticism ought always to seek to clarify whether and to what extent the questions it is trying to answer continue to be questions worth having answers to. And, therefore, what this idea of a problem-space does is to oblige us to frame the criticism of the present in terms of the strategic value of responding- or evading response-to the conventions of the language-game we find ourselves participants in. This way of coming at the problem of criticism's construal of the relation between colonial pasts and the postcolonial present, as I explain in Refashioning Futures, is one I derive in large part from the Hegelian philosopher R. G. Collingwood and his more Wittgensteinian disciple, Quentin Skinner. I come back in the following chapter to their work and my uses of it, but there is another salient formulation of the problem of historical investigation from which I have learned a great deal and which bears preliminary consideration here-not least because of the points of contact between it and the question-and-answer approach of Collingwood and Skinner, and also because it is explicitly concerned with some of the problems of time and revolutionary thought that are going to engage my attention in this book. I am thinking of the work of Bernard Yack, in particular his very remarkable book, The Longing for Total Revolution. 6 Published about two decades ago, Yack's book is animated by a certain skepticism regarding the specific shape of modern social and political discontent and the radical hopes and expectations and demands that have often been derived from that discontent. These radical hopes and expectations and demands, Yack suggested, have been infused by a distinctive desire for social transformation, a desire he felicitously calls "a longing for total revolution." In Yack's view, however, these radical hopes and expectations and demands are philosophically incoherent as well as practically impossible, and only a comprehensive revision of our understanding of the philosophical sources of the discontent that inspires them can begin to clarify our contemporary predicaments, and open out possible cognitive-political paths beyond them. Now, I may not share the ideological hopes that inspire Yack's political position (they are largely liberal hopes, so far as I can tell), but I think that the framing conceptual move he urges is an instructive and enabling one, and I should like to commend it. 7 As he suggests, many studies of revolutionary discontent have failed to adequately understand the role of new concepts in generating social discontent. This is because they have mistakenly focused on the way these concepts define alternatives to the present social limitations rather than on the way they shape our understanding of these limitations themselves. Notice the orientation of Yack's approach, its family resemblance to Collingwood's question-and-answer logic: it is the conceptualization of the obstacles to be overcome that interests him, not the seeming virtues of the proffered alternatives. Or, to put it otherwise, for Yack, the analytical purchase of the latter cannot be understood without a genealogy of the former. In short, historicizing past hopes (such as anticolonial ones) ought to entail an analysis less of the transformative projects themselves than of the way those hopes reflect a certain understanding of the problem to be overcome; in Yack's language, the way the sources of discontent or the obstacles to satisfaction are conceived and defined. ANTICOLONIALISM HAS BEEN a classic instance of the modern longing for total revolution. In some of the texts that define its ethos and aspiration- Aime Cesaire's Discourse on Colonialism, for instance, or Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth- colonialism is conceived largely as a totalizing structure of brutality, violence, objectification, racism, and exclusion that the anticolonial revolution was supposed to overcome. Colonialism was principally described as a negative structure of limiting and stultifying power to which the anticolonialists were obliged to respond with a positive and regenerative counter-power. I am not concerned to doubt the justification of this view. My worry, however, has been that in challenging the anticolonialist's answers rather than their questions postcolonialism has uncritically taken over this Fanonian image of colonialism**.** So that, paradoxically, although postcolonial theorists have elaborated postcolonial answers (by which I mean have employed a familiar poststructuralist apparatus to demonstrate the instability of the concepts their predecessors took for granted) they have continued to assume an anticolonial picture of the problem of colonialism. That is to say, the conception of colonialism that postcolonialism has constructed and made the target of its analytical focus has continued to bear the distinctive traces of anticolonialism's conceptual preoccupations. And consequently postcolonialism has continued to be concerned with exposing the negative structure of colonialism's power and with demonstrating the colonized's agency in resisting or overcoming these conditions. In this book I should like to urge us away from this preoccupation. My argument, of course, is not that colonialism was not a structure of violence and brutality. I have no doubt that it was (and that it continues to be where it persists). My argument is that (as Yack suggests) the way one defines an alternative depends on the way one has conceived the problem. And therefore, reconceiving alternatives depends in significant part on reconceiving the object of discontent and thus the longing that stimulates the desire for an alternative. The view I wish to commend is that it is not the anticolonial nationalist's answers that have needed changing so much as the postcolonial theorist's questions that needed dissolving. To put this proposition another way: it is the old object of our anticolonial discontent that stands in need of reformulation. We need, in other words, to give up constructing an image of colonialism that demands from us an attitude of anticolonial longing, a longing for anticolonial revolution. It seems to me that a more fruitful approach to the historical appreciation of prior understandings of the relation between pasts, presents, and futures is to think of different historical conjunctures as constituting different conceptual-ideological problem-spaces, and to think of these problem-spaces less as generators of new propositions than as generators of new questions and new demands. Consequently, what is important is to read historically not just for the answers that this or that theorist has produced but for the questions that are more or less the epistemological conditions for those answers. Part of what is at stake here, clearly, is the problem of narrative, because the relation between pasts, presents, and futures is a relation constituted in narrative discourse. In this book, I have been particularly inspired by Hayden White's metahistorical intervention in debates about the writing of history, and specifically his argument for an understanding of the "content of the form" of historical narrative. If the forms of narrative, White suggests, have built into their linguistic structures different myth-models or story-potentials, and if different stories organize the relation between past, present, and future differently, it may be important to inquire into the relation between the poetic form and the conceptual and ideological content of historical discourse. Historically minded criticisms of colonialism seem to me to have something to learn from this idea. Does anticolonialism depend upon a certain way telling the story about the past, present, and future? I mean this question in a narratological sense. Is the narrative connecting pasts, presents, and futures distinctively constructed within anticolonial texts? Or to put it slightly differently: Does the political point of anticolonialism depend on constructing colonialism as a particular kind of conceptual and ideological object? Does the moral point of anticolonialism depend on constructing colonialism as a particular kind of obstacle to be overcome? Does the purchase or salience of anticolonialism depend on a certain narrative form, a certain rhythm, and a certain conception of temporality? Does the anticolonial demand for a certain kind of postcolonial future oblige its histories to produce certain kinds of pasts? I am going to suggest that anticolonial stories about past, present, and future have typically been emplotted in a distinctive narrative form, one with a distinctive story-potential: that of Romance. They have tended to be narratives of overcoming, often narratives of vindication; they have tended to enact a distinctive rhythm and pacing, a distinctive direction, and to tell stories of salvation and redemption. They have largely depended upon a certain (utopian) horizon toward which the emancipationist history is imagined to be moving. I do not take this conceptual framework to be a mistake. However, in the wake of the global historicopolitical and cognitive shifts that have taken place in the past decade or two, I have a doubt about the continued critical salience of this narrative form and its underlying mythos. Indeed, my wager in this book is that the problem about postcolonial futures- how we go about reimagining what we might become of what we have so far made- cannot be recast without recasting the problem about colonial pasts. My undertaking here is aimed at offering one approach to such an inquiry.8

#### Our kritik turns the case. West essentialism undermines search for anti-imperial tactics. Centering Western agency demotes all others to observers and treats resistance as futile.

Hobson, PhD, 07

(John M, IR@SHeffield, Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? Beyond Westphilian towards a postracist critical IR. Review of International Studies, 33, pp 91116 doi:10.1017/S0260210507007413)

To get to grips with answering the question ‘how can critical IR theory be seen as for the White West and for Western imperialism?’ it is noteworthy that much confusion surrounds the definition of Eurocentrism. Some assume that it refers to analyses that focus only on the West. But it is perfectly possible to write a Eurocentric book that focuses only on the East, since what matters here is the ideological lens through which the analysis is framed. Others assume that Eurocentrism is an explicit celebration of all things Western.5 But one can be Eurocentric at the same time as being critical of the West. To resolve this confusion I differentiate ‘conscious’ from ‘subliminal’ Eurocentrism. ‘Conscious Eurocentrism’, as referenced above, is found in those writers who explicitly celebrate all things Western while consciously or explicitly denigrating all things Eastern. ‘Subliminal Eurocentrism’ is much more subtle, though no less Orientalist. It does not celebrate **the West but is** highly critical of it. But what makes it Eurocentric is the assumption that the West lies at the centre of all things in the world and that the West self-generates through its own endogenous ‘logic of immanence’, before projecting its global will-to-power outwards through a one-way diffusionism so as to remake the world in its own image. I call this pervading white mythology of IR the Westphilian narrative (twinned with its accompanying Eastphobian narrative). Indeed, the main problem with IR is not simply that it is constrained within a ‘Westphalian straitjacket’,6 but more that it is contained within a ‘Westphilian straitjacket’ that at once renders racist hierarchy and racism invisible in the world while simultaneously issuing racist Eurocentric explanatory models of the world. Most significantly, the uncomfortable implication of this is that the extent to which many critical IR theorists reiterate the Westphilian narrative means that their analyses are for the White West and for Western imperialism in various senses. First is the assumption that self-generating Western agency and power in the world is ‘the only game in town’ which, when coupled with the dismissal of Eastern agency, unwittingly naturalises Western civilisation and Western imperialism. Second, it deserves emphasising that the representational leitmotif of British imperialism was the very notion of White Western supremacy and Black Eastern inferiority, which served to demoralise the colonised Other in order to portray resistance as futile. Of course, Gramscian IR prides itself on its ability to locate counter-hegemonic resistance. But by elevating world politics/economics into a panopticonesque Western fetish the prospects for Eastern resistance are unwittingly demoted. Moreover, when one scans Cox’s major writings, there is surprisingly little discussion of counter-movements and, where there is, the prospect for counter-hegemony is portrayed as very poor given the general representation of the (Western) working class as overwhelmed by the power of global capital.7 And though there are some notable exceptions,8 this problem is repeated across most of Gramscian IR.9 It is for these reasons, then, that much of Gramscian and other forms of CIRT turn out to be (unwittingly) for the White West and for Western imperialism. (92-3)

#### We should adopt a *tragic* framing of the problem of colonialism. A tragic frame starts from the premise that we are *never* in the position of complete self-determination. Tragedy doesn’t know it’s own ending in advance and acknowledges that political choices are never completely transparent or ethically justifiable.

David **SCOTT** Anthropology @ Columbia **‘4** *Conscripts of Modernity* p. 9-14

In more recent years, a number of scholars - classicists, philosophers, literary scholars, and political theorists among them-have turned their attention to exploring these (and other) critical resources of tragedy, some more affiliated with the Aristotelian reflection on the ethics of human action than with the Hegelian concern with the individual's embodiment of historical conflict. My own exploration of the problem of tragedy in The Black Jacobins is indebted to their work, especially that of Charles Segal, Martha Nussbaum, J. Peter Euben, Christopher Rocco, and Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet.16 In this work, variously articulated, of course, tragedy is seen as offering a literary-philosophical genre in which a number of the consequential theoretical shibboleths of our time are challenged. For these writers, tragedy offers the most searching reflection on human action, intention, and chance, with significant implications for how we think the connections among past, present, and future. Tragedy questions, for example, the view of human history as moving teleologically and transparently toward a determinate end, or as governed by a sovereign and omnisciently rational agent. These views of human history suppose that the past can be cleanly separated from the present, and that reason can be unambiguously disentangled from myth. Tragedy raises doubts about the salience of the Platonist vision of the hyperrational ideal and the Kantian belief in the sufficiency and autonomy of the self. These conceptions of the subject and its actions depend upon a decisive blow being delivered to the poetic and to the idea of human being as dependent on or vulnerable to forces and powers not entirely within its rational control. Above all, tragedy is troubled by the hubris of enlightenment and civilization, power and knowledge. As we will see, however, the strategy of tragedy is not to dismiss out of hand the claims of reason, but to honor the contingent, the ambiguous, the paradoxical, and the unyielding in human affairs in such a way as to complicate our most cherished notions about the relation between identity and difference, reason and unreason, blindness and insight, action and responsibility, guilt and innocence. As Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet eloquently put it in a fascinating passage: From a tragic point of view, there are two aspects to action. It involves on the one hand reflection, weighing up the pros and cons, foreseeing as accurately as possible the means and the ends; on the other, placing one's stake on what is unknown and incomprehensible, risking oneself on a terrain that remains impenetrable, entering into a game with supernatural forces, not knowing whether, as they join with one, they will bring success or doom. Even for the most foreseeing of men, the most carefully thought out action is still a chancy appeal to the gods and only by their reply, and usually to one's cost, will one learn what it really involved and meant. It is only when the drama is over that actions take on their true significance and agents, through what they have in reality accomplished without realizing it, discover their true identity. So long as there has been no complete consummation, human affairs remain enigmas that are the more obscure the more the actors believe themselves sure of what they are doing and what they areP In short, tragedy sets before us the image of a man or woman obliged to act in a world in which values are unstable and ambiguous. And consequently, for tragedy the relation between past, present, and future is never a Romantic one in which history rides a triumphant and seamlessly progressive rhythm, but a broken series of paradoxes and reversals in which human action is ever open to unaccountable contingencies and luck.1s I want to suggest that this is the understanding of action, history, and enlightenment that James's revisions to the second edition of The Black Jacobins alert us to. The local stage upon which the dramatic action takes place is framed by the world-historical relation between New World slavery and modern civilization (their constitutive connection as well as their constitutive antagonism) and the irreparable breach opened by the French Revolution which altered forever the epistemic and political conditions in which thought and action were possible in the modern world. In this setting of profound social upheaval and historical conflict, James's great protagonist, Toussaint Louverture, is placed at a crossroads of absolute choice between options to which he is equally and completely committed (the freedom of the slaves on the one hand and the enlightenment of revolutionary France on the other) and in circumstances in which he must choose and yet cannot choose without fatal cost. Considered in this way, I think that the revised edition of The Black ]acobins urges us to take another- and a hard -look at the consoling (anticolonial) story we have told ourselves about colonialism and civilization, modernity and enlightenment, and especially the vindicationist narratives of emancipation that have animated our hopes for a world without dissatisfaction, injustice, and unhappiness. Read as a tragedy of colonial enlightenment, The Black ]acobins transgresses the now conventional Romance of revolutionary overcoming and offers us the elements of a critical story of our postcolonial time.

### T – USFG – 1NC

#### Topical affirmatives must increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of core antitrust laws.

#### The affirmative is not topical. “United States federal government” means the three branches of the central government – the affirmative does not advocate action by the USFG.

Organisation OECD for Economic Co-operation and Development Council ’87 “United States,” *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*, p. 179]

1. Political and organisational structure of government

The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of **three branches**: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### The Sherman, Clayton, and FTC act are the core antitrust laws.

Gibbs ‘ND [Gibbs Law Group; “The Sherman Antitrust Act”; https://www.classlawgroup.com/antitrust/federal-laws/sherman-act/; AS]

The Sherman Antitrust Act is one of three core federal antitrust laws, along with the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

#### Prohibitions are laws.

Dictionary.com ‘ND [Dictionary.com; “Prohibition” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/prohibition; AS]

a law or decree that forbids.

#### Their interpretation explodes predictable limits – non-topical advocacies encourage the affirmative to dodge negative strategies, which are all based on a predictable reading of the resolution. The negative requires pre-round research in order to stand a chance against the affirmative’s infinite preparation and use of traditional standards of debate such as permutations – including their affirmative makes negative research an impossibility, even if we have “ground” to debate them. It greenlights any methodology or orientation that is tangentially related to the topic – negative preparation requires in depth case negatives.

#### Two impacts:

#### Procedural fairness – debate is a game and we are all here to win – debate is a competitive activity and requires game values to function – this is the largest impact – we have all chosen to spend our weekend here in order to compete.

#### Clash – you should privilege debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm – unflinching commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory. Promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate

## Case

### Case – Frontline – 1NC

#### They don't have an ontology argument in the 1AC, don't let the 2AC invent one. There's not a single card that has 'ontology' highlighted. Their cards might criticize liberalism and property ownership, but their evidence does not rise to the level of making ontological or structural claims to say that those structures can't be changed or improved.

#### Paternalism DA – Patel is a non-Indigenous scholar that cherry-picks historical accounts of liberal reform - while she endorses Jodi Byrd (Chickasaw), she discards Elizabeth Cook-Lynn (Crow Creek Sioux) who is a treaty advocate. This selective endorsement has 2 impacts. First, they foreclose traditional policy debate for those who wish to engage state demands. Second, they demonize political efforts of Indigenous senators like Deb Haaland, or Sharice Davids, or Paulette Jordan.

#### Passivity DA – Voting neg doesn't return land – it just makes you feel good and progressive and makes you think you've done something good for Natives, when nothing actually changes and we all will still occupy Native land – voting aff is worse because it makes you feel like a good settler.

#### The aff relies on violent essentialism that violates indigenous humanity.

Rodrigue-Allouche 15, MA Uppsala, Dept of Archaeology and Ancient History, (Sarah, “Conservation and Indigenous Peoples The adoption of the ecological noble savage discourse and its political consequences, Proquest Theses)//BB

As shown above through colonisation, indigenous peoples have been conceived as biologically inferior to White people, in an ethnical hierarchy and justified by so-called science. In the late 20th century, as scientific racism was discredited, another cultural stereotype started to emerge; the idea that culturally, Indigenous peoples are closer to Nature. But this idea might only be another display of essentialism.

1. Indigenous peoples and their environment: intentional or epiphenomenal conservation?

The idea that indigenous peoples respect their environment probably stem from the fact that most environmental degradation was caused by state societies whereas hunter-gatherer tribes certainly had less impact (see Borgerhoff Mulder and Coppolillo 2005). Besides, comparative studies have shown a correlation between the presence of indigenous peoples and high biodiversity whereas the presence of non-indigenous is correlated to low biodiversity (Redford and Robinson 1987). However, it is unavoidable to ask whether this is intentional or simply a consequence of a certain lifestyle correlated to a low population density and a low access to technology. Indeed, anthropologist Eugene S. Hunn was the first scholar to emphasise the intentionality factor in conservation; in a 1982 article he distinguished epiphenomenal (or side-effect) conservation from intentional conservation. In 2000, anthropologist Eric Alden Smith and forester Mark Wishnie followed Hunn’s lead and defined the term ‘conservation’ as actions preventing or mitigating biodiversity loss and designed to do so. Smith and Wishnie (2000: 493) in a review of existing research concluded that intentional conservation amongst indigenous peoples or what they called ‘voluntary conservation’ is rare. Below, I will review the debate around epiphenomenal conservation according to Hunn’s definition. In 1987, Redford and Robinson, compared hunting yields of sixteen native groups in the Amazon to six Peruvian and Brazilian backwoodsmen. Their study demonstrated that colonists had hunted a more limited number of species and had a more negative impact on the game populations because of factors such as a greater population density, catering to extra local demand, and a more efficient technology. On the other hand, because Native Amazonians took a wider variety of game, they had a less significant impact on game populations than colonists. It is very hard to assess whether this case is one of intentional or epiphenomenal conservation. In effect, it is ethically problematic to decide for other peoples if their practices constitute conscious choices or are simply necessary. I wish to advocate to keep in mind when reading such data that Indigenous communities are constituted of many individuals who each have different preferences and understandings of the world; and not to deny individuality to those who belong to Indigenous tribes. The debate on epiphenomenal vs intentional conservation intensified among the scholarly community when American anthropologist Shepard Krech III published a book aiming at debunking the idea of ecological-friendliness among Indigenous peoples. He postulated that Native Americans did not follow conservation practices before contact with Whites and overused resources during the contact period. Krech concluded that although Native Americans understood complex environmental interactions, they made no systematic efforts to conserve game species. Researchers in anthropology, biology and archaeology have since been debating about indigenous peoples and conservationist practices. In 1994, Allyn MacLean Stearman declared that the idea of ecological nobility was due to a few ethnographic cases that had been indiscriminately generalized to all indigenous peoples (Stearman 1994: 2). I agree with Stearman that generalisations do not form the basis of sound conclusions. Indeed, anthropologist Michael S. Alvard researching the evolution of human behaviour demonstrated that conservation most likely occurs under restricted circumstances. Using foraging theory in order to determine the hunting preferences of the Piro hunters in the Amazonian Peru, Alvard stated that Piro hunters make decisions consistent with foraging theory predictions 25 and do not hesitate to kill game identified as vulnerable to over-hunting (1993). Alvard (idem.) stresses that although indigenous peoples have an intimate knowledge of their environment, there is not enough empirical evidence to state that they use this knowledge in order to maintain equilibrium within the ecosystems surrounding them or to sustain their resources. In 2002, the University of Wyoming hosted a conference entitled Re-figuring the ecological Indian which led to the publication of a volume edited by Harkin and Lewis (2007). Many supported Krech’s claim that Native American practices were not aimed at conservation of resources. American social anthropologist Ernest S. Burch who had been doing research on the historic social organization of the Eskimo peoples in the Artic, notably demonstrated that Native Alaskan hunters drove a number of species to local extinction (Burch 2007). Burch concluded that nearly all groups harvested sustainably until the arrival of Europeans, but sustainability was un-intended. The introduction of breech loading rifles and the high trade value placed on local hides and furs led to cases of over-harvesting. Hence, Burch (idem.) supports the hypothesis of epiphenomenal conservation. But is indigenous technological efficiency really limited? If epiphenomenal conservation is a consequence of limited technology, it is essential to assess the efficiency of indigenous weapons. In 1978, anthropological Eric Ross fostered a controversy when he advanced that traditional indigenous hunting technology can be more efficient than modern western technology and that shotguns have reduced the efficiency with which certain important animals can be killed (quoted in Yost and Kelley 1983). If Ross’s statement is correct it supports the view that Indigenous peoples are intentional conservationists because they do possess the technology to overkill. Many anthropologists have since published data to counteract Ross and assert that indigenous technology is less efficient and does not allow hunters to kill the same species of animals that a shotgun would11 . For instance, Hames responded with extensive data indicating again that the shotgun is a far more efficient weapon than the bow (quoted in Yost and Kelley 1983). However, despite the controversy it can be established that the efficiency of indigenous weapons’ efficiency is undoubtable. In 1979, Chagnon and Hames demonstrated that the bow and arrow are quite adequate to provide population with sufficient levels of protein (idem.). In the same vein, Yost and Kelley (1983) were the first anthropologists to advance data supporting the efficiency of the blowgun and spear as I will develop in the next part. The fact that many indigenous societies rely on common-property regimes could also strengthen the hypothesis of epiphenomenal conservation is also strengthened. Indeed, common-property regimes might encourage a wise utilisation of resources. For instance, anthropologist Flora Lu conducted fieldwork among the Huaorani of Ecuador who function on a common property regime in which people are free to choose any available location to clear a plot of land for a garden (Lu 2001: 433), and concluded that when people live in small sub-populations of closely related kin, they are much more accountable to each other (Lu Holt 2001: 439) – a situation which probably encourages the preservation of resources and thus indirectly fosters conservationist practices. Common-property regimes could thus result in epiphenomenal conservation; although in 1968, American economist Garrett Hardin asserted that in a situation of open-access resources, depletion would soon occur (Olstrom 1990, 2005; Berkes et al. 2000; Berkes 2004; Olsson et al 2004; Barthell et al 2013b; Ruiz-Mallén and Corbera 2013). Although indigenous conservationist practices may seem to be cases of epiphenomenal conservation, a few famous case-studies of indigenous resource management attest that indigenous communities can be deliberate conservationists. One of them was published by American anthropologist and ethnobiologist Eugene Hunn and colleagues (Hunn et al. 2007) and relates the traditional gull-eggs harvests in Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve in Alaska, indicating that the 11 Beckermann, Good, Nietschmann and Vickers all reacted promptly in Current Anthropology (Volume 19, 1978) to contradict his contention that traditional technology was more effective than the shotgun 26 Huna Tlingit peoples possess an extensive knowledge and understanding of the glaucous-winged gull nesting biology and behaviour. Traditional gull-eggs harvests seem to represent a case of intentional conservation. Another case-study of intentional conservation is Harvey A. Feit’s presentation of conservationist hunting practices of the Waswanipi Cree peoples. An essential component of Waswanipi’s cosmology is the north wind spirit, the chuetenshu, who provides men with enough to eat as long as they respect other species. Here, the link between Waswanipi’s cosmology and the sustainable use of resources is obvious, as Feit emphasises that the hunter must act responsibly towards the game and the north wind spirit (Feit 1973: 76). Waswanipi hunting seems well to be a case of deliberate conservation because hunters possess the skill and technology to kill many animals but it is part of their responsibilities to abstain from killing more than necessary, and not to kill for enjoyment or prestige (idem.). Overall it is important to bear in mind that conservation can only occur when people are aware of resource scarcity, which is far from being the rule. Indeed, anthropologist Natalie Smith conducted interviews among the Machiguenga people in the Peruvian Amazon to understand their management patterns. When asked why the amount of game had decreased around the village, Machiguenga men interviewed replied that animals had been scared or that they were hiding. Many people declared that the amount of animals had remained the same or increased, simply they were further away from the village (Smith 2001: 435). Moreover, although the fallow time had significantly decreased these past decades, when asked about the decreasing yields, informants asserted that poor seeds or spiritual contamination were responsible for poor yields and not soil problems. Smith also interviewed the men hunters to find out if they avoided killing pregnant and younger animals, but the informants replied they could not make any distinction (idem., p. 446). Smith makes it clear that the Machiguenga are not conservationists; it is no criticism but simply a fact that the Machiguenga lack the social structure and information necessary that would enable them to carry out informed conservation. This is common to many indigenous societies which lack awareness of resource scarcity and thus where conservation cannot exist. Indeed, Lu Holt (2001: 432), in connection to her fieldwork with the Huaorani of Ecuador, wrote that she was repeatedly told by the community that no resources were rare or scarce. On the basis of the review I gave above, I contend that it is impossible to generalise over the question of intentional or epiphenomenal conservation. It seems that each indigenous society constitutes a unique case. Though indigenous communities have institutions in place to manage resources sustainably, it is unclear to what degree this can be called intentional conservation or not; these practices also rely on very distinctive cosmologies and social negotiations. Thus, conservation does bring a foreign concept in indigenous cosmologies, as I will develop further later. But before going into this I want to stress that indigenous peoples are not conservationists but merely humans.

2. Indigenous peoples, merely humans

A broad scholarship has demonstrated cases of environmental destruction among indigenous peoples. In 1985, American anthropologist A. Terry Rambo claimed that the Semang, a nonindustrial small-scale society of Peninsular Malaysia, affected their environment in some ways as much as or even more than industrial societies. Other scholars have raised case-studies to demonstrate that environmental destruction is a common feature among human societies, whether indigenous or not., world-famous American cultural geographer Jared Diamond presented well-documented examples of environmental indifference or destruction by tribal peoples in his book Collapse (2005). In the contemporary controversy around indigenous peoples and ecological nobility, two sides emerged: some people use data demonstrating that indigenous peoples have wreaked havoc on their environments in order to dispossess them of their rights, whom Diamond qualifies of ‘rac- 27 ists’, while others reject such scholarship because it threatens Indigenous peoples’ status of ecological angels (Diamond 2005: 8-9). Diamond acknowledges that indigenous peoples do not like to be told that their ancestors caused damage to the ecosystems because it seems that this assertion prejudices their rights to land ownership (idem.). However, although it has become politically incorrect to assert that indigenous populations wrecked damage on their environment, this fact simply points out our common humanity. The interest of Diamond’s work lies in its clear emphasis that all human societies share the same human traits, that very different societies located in different times and spaces have had negative impacts on their environments, and oftentimes were powerless over their own impacts. Indigenous peoples do not fundamentally differ from modern First World peoples; indeed, managing environmental resources has always been a challenge since mankind developed inventiveness and hunting skills around 50 000 years ago and wherever humans settled, large animals which had evolved without fear of the human species underwent destruction (Diamond 2005: 9). It is paramount to understand what being human entails, no matter where one originates from. By emphasising our common humanity, researchers’ work can help tearing apart essentialism.

#### “Decolonization” is too vague to be meaningful-structural claims of set col make it impossible.

Bashir and Busbridge, PhDs, 19

(Bashir, Sociology@OpenUniv., Rachel, ACUs National School of Arts , The Politics of Decolonisation and Bi-Nationalism in Israel/Palestine Vol 67, Issue 2, 2019)

For all its attached redemptive prospects and radical possibilities, it is important to emphasise that the meanings of decolonisation as both a concept and political project are not just broad, but also multifaceted and highly contested. What it means to ‘undo’ colonialism is deeply contextual (Jansen and Osterhammel, 2017). While colonialism can be defined broadly as a relationship of domination in which a people or territory is politically and economically subjugated to a foreign power, actual colonial situations vary quite widely from each other, depending on, among others, the particular political systems instituted to maintain control, types of exploitation and expropriation (resources, labour, plantations), relationship between the metropole and colony and patterns of migration they compel (slavery, settlement). Projects of decolonisation accordingly take different forms even if they are united by the common concern of ending or overturning structures of domination instituted by colonialism, which has historically taken place mostly through the withdrawal of colonial powers and achievement of independence for the colonised (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation speaks to the aspiration of self-rule and its concomitant critique of colonialism as the ‘systematic denial of freedom’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 6) and is therefore entangled with a variety of concerns, namely, self-determination, justice, equality, freedom and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. As Todd Shepherd (2006: 3–4) writes, decolonisation is ‘a much wider concept than the mere “winning of Independence” or “transfer of power”… It entails the exploration of dreams, the analysis of struggles, compromises, pledges and achievements, and the rethinking of fundamentals’. Traditional literature on decolonisation approached it in terms of the historical process that began in the immediate aftermath of World War Two in which countries previously under (typically European) foreign rule transitioned to constitutional independence (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation was one of the most significant developments of the twentieth century, radically changing the face of the globe from one in which a small number of empires had dominion over some 80% of the earth’s surface to an international order based on the principle of self-determination and made up of ostensibly independent states (Hopkins, 2008). Scholars in this tradition have done much to illuminate the widereaching structural transformations that accompanied decolonisation, including the emergence of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles at the turn of the century, shifts in world economy that made the maintenance of traditional forms of Empire increasingly difficult, the development of a ‘Third World’ political project and the institutionalisation of human and civic rights principles that rendered systems based on ideas of racial and ethnic superiority less viable (Hopkins, 2008: 216). Yet, the focus on transition has been critiqued for its narrowness insofar as it seems to take for granted the meanings of selfdetermination and temporally restricts decolonisation to the moment of national liberation. Postcolonial scholars, among others, have been at the forefront of this charge, arguing that decolonisation did not produce a postcolonial world per se, but rather one that continues to be shaped in significant ways by the legacies of European colonialism (e.g. Spivak, 1999). As Ella Shohat (1992) has argued, there is no way of turning back from the world colonialism set in play nor did colonial modes of domination end with the formal period of decolonisation. From this broadened perspective, decolonisation is the difficult task of tracing the economic, political, social, cultural, relational and linguistic consequences of colonialism and is therefore also an ongoing imaginative project seeking ‘a new form of consciousness and way of life’ (Pieterse and Parekh, 1995: 3) beyond the coloniality of modern modes of culture, identity and knowledge more generally. While the transitional focus of conventional scholarship is quite illuminating in the contexts of Africa and Asia, for example, it furthermore excludes a great many decolonisation efforts that have taken place and continue to take place in other regions. This includes countries that remained dependent or only achieved semi-independence as dominions, decolonising projects carried out in territories never formally under colonial rule (the Iranian Revolution, for instance) and – as is particularly important to our discussion here – settler colonies that only partially decolonised, whether by way of loosening ties with the Motherland or achieving independence, but which continue to dominate substantial indigenous populations (Hopkins, 2008). There is a significant lacuna in the decolonisation literature when it comes to settler colonialism, which has increasingly been recognised as a distinct form of colonial practice – and one that is particularly resistant to decolonisation (Veracini, 2007). As the transfer of an exogenous population to a territory they intend to claim as their permanent home, settler colonialism establishes quite a different structural relationship to ‘traditional’ forms of colonialism, especially when settler colonial projects succeed in creating a state (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011). Rather than governing native peoples in order to extract resources for economic gain, settler colonisers instead aim to ‘seize their land and push them beyond an ever-expanding frontier of settlement’ (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 2). For Patrick Wolfe (2006), what distinguishes settler colonialism is thus that it is guided by a logic of elimination as opposed to a logic of exploitation, wherein the eradication of indigenous presence is essential to the success of settler colonial projects. The primacy of national liberation in the literature makes it especially difficult to imagine, let alone theorise, decolonisation in many settler colonial contexts. Whereas some settler colonial projects like Algeria and Kenya saw decolonisation by way of a mass settler exodus, paving the way for the establishment of independent states, the more successful ones established permanent settler communities (e.g. Northern Ireland) or their own states (e.g. Australia, Canada, the United States) which preclude a simple transition from foreign rule to sovereign status (Veracini, 2007). This is of course not to say that self-determination of the type aspired to by anti-colonial national movements was an easy or even necessarily achievable task. As Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest, in pursuing the dream of self-rule, anti-colonial thinkers had to reckon with the difficulties of articulating alternative political foundations that would make for a genuinely self-determining polity, an enormous task which demands decolonising of minds as much institutions and territory (see Fanon, 2001[1963]). Decolonisation must pursue a convincing ‘break’ between a colonial past and a postcolonial future ‘through decisive action in the present’; it must also ‘seek to reinterpret the past in such a way that it may help in the present and future struggle for self-rule’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 19). While these pursuits are invariably contingent, partial and commonly symbolic, national liberation struggles very often provide the fodder for a reinterpreted past that is robustly positive and the establishment of an independent state serves as that aspired for ‘break’. Settler colonial contexts, especially those where indigenous peoples live as minorities in settler states, make these types of symbolic transitions challenging, as they do the imagining of postcolonial alternatives. If the narrative structure of colonialism is circular (leave, stay, return), making that symbolic break possible, settler colonial narratives are linear insofar as the settler comes to stay and the line continues on unbroken (Veracini, 2007). As Ann Curthoys (1999: 288) writes, settler colonial spaces are simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising, which makes decolonisation temporally ambivalent at best. Lorenzo Veracini (2007) suggests that there are only two alternatives to settler evacuation for decolonising settler colonial forms and it is dubious whether one of these counts as decolonisation at all: the decolonisation of relationships through ‘the promotion of various processes of Indigenous reconciliation’ or the maintenance of the status quo ‘with the explicit rejection of the possibility of reforming the settler body politic’. Again, what the former might mean is often vague, and historically it is the decolonisation of relationships that is hardest to come by considering the psychological consequences of colonialism for coloniser and colonised alike (Memmi, 1965). Like traditional forms of colonialism, settler colonialism was legitimated by a belief in the colonised’s racial and cultural inferiority. However, the specific settler colonial pursuit of land seizure compels additional stereotypes of native peoples or unique applications of existing colonial ones, wherein their supposed inferiority makes them ill-equipped to develop that land (premodern, nomadic, barbaric) or, alternatively, voids any claims to ownership (terra nullius). In other words, settler colonialism is as much premised on the denial of indigenous peoples as a political constituency with rights to land as it is their purported inferiority, which is typically enshrined in their status as second-class citizens with all the economic, cultural and social disadvantage this entails (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011: 3). Given that settler societies are marked by ‘pervasive inequalities, usually codified in law, between native and settler populations’ which preserve political and economic privileges for the latter (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 4), decolonising relationships demands structural changes that often encounter significant resistance from settler constituencies. Likewise, it requires a reckoning with historical injustice – specifically violence and conflict at the colonial frontier – that is challenging for settler states and populations because it opens questions of settler identity, privileges, legitimacy and reparations and expressly seeks to scrutinise disavowed and long suppressed histories. Settler colonial decolonisation is thus complicated by a multitude of hurdles, which bring the postcolonial caution of the impossibility of a ‘break’ into stark relief. Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest that decisive action in the present is essential to decolonisation, but in settler colonial contexts this is hindered by power discrepancies between settler and native constituencies, a general lack of settler political will to enter into difficult processes of historical introspection as well as the constraining of Indigenous claims within the settler state. Indeed, even a commitment to a postcolonial polity as expressed through processes of historical reconciliation often encounters strong resistance when it comes to judicial, constitutional or legislative change genuinely decolonised relationships would demand. Nevertheless, even if it remains difficult to comprehensively imagine the decolonisation of ‘settler societies vis-à-vis Indigenous constituencies’ (Veracini, 2007), the central question must be how to construct political foundations which simultaneously acknowledge ‘the practices of racism, violence and subordination’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 18) that preceded them while also paving the way for a postcolonial future in which natives and settlers are equal parties and share the right to narrate the polity. Equality, freedom and justice may come from legally enshrining Indigenous rights to self-determination or, alternatively, doing away with the categories of ‘settler’ and ‘native’ altogether (Mamdani, 2001). What shape such efforts are likely to take depends, among others, on the ‘size and tenacity’ of Indigenous populations as well as the power of the settler constituency (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 3, 6). But we would suggest that the measure to which they may

#### Challenging monopolization good – extending the economic and political benefits of membership beyond existing classes best for struggle against settlerism.

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Thus, to universalize settler liberty — as I argue for in the book — would require a fundamental restructuring of American life. This is something radical critics themselves perceived at various moments in American history. It would mean thinking about how a democratic principle could actually govern all institutional sites and provide all communities with meaningful economic and political power.

Such an effort would transform, root and branch, settler legacies and living practices: from recognizing Indian sovereignty to fundamentally altering the structure of the economy to challenging the border as a closed barrier. The key thing to note is that such freedom, although emerging from a settler past, would no longer perpetuate settlerism.

This speaks to what I see as the dialectical character of freedom, where the conflict between an initial account of liberty and its opposition produces something new. And similarly, I would add that I do not believe that if we ever “universalized” settler freedom this would mean the end of subordination once and for all. Rather, in keeping with the dialectical vision, even successful projects of emancipation generate new legal and political orders that knit together secured liberties with emerging hierarchies.

In other words, the struggle for freedom is ongoing; it requires an aspiration to utopia but is never completely redeemed in history. This is to say that I don’t believe we can overcome the impasse of settler violence simply by rising above it or thinking differently — we are stuck with our particular histories and the modes of freedom and subordination that constitute our discursive frameworks and institutional practices. These histories open up the possibility of transformation — they give us tools to imagine utopias — but they can never be completely overcome.

This also underscores why my argument is not nostalgic, despite its discussion of the emancipatory dimensions of settler freedom. Those emancipatory elements were grounded in extreme violence. Indeed, one reason why I choose to refer to these arguments as “settler” — with all its fraught implications — rather than simply republican, populist, or socialist is to avoid extricating American economic radicalism from its colonial underpinnings.

This history of extreme violence means that there is no past we need to find a way back to; the settler experience offers no golden age before modern American imperialism. This acknowledgment perhaps distinguishes my views from those of critics like Christopher Lasch or even William Appleman Williams. If anything, for me, the two logics of empire — settler colonization and global police power — cannot be thought of as distinct historical periods. They are deeply interlinked and fold into one another rather than marking clear breaks or ruptures in time.

Why does this discussion of settler freedom as integral to US conceptions of sovereignty and governance matter for something called the Left today?

I think it’s essential for at least two reasons.

First, a remarkable feature of US domestic conversations about capitalism and economic inequality is the extent to which they are often separated from conversations about the application of US power abroad. As just one example, take the issue of immigration and immigrant rights, a focal point of new labor organizing on the one hand and conservative reaction on the other.

The overwhelming tendency is to present immigration as an issue that begins at the national border, with virtually no attention paid to the particular histories, international economic pressures, and specific US foreign policy practices that generate migration patterns in the first place. The movement of men and women from their homes does not occur in a vacuum and is deeply tied to patterns of colonization and empire that stitch together the Global North and the Global South, as well as to the recent security politics of the US and Europe across the post-colonial world.

On the Left, it’s obviously taken as a truism that capitalism is a global system requiring global political action. But without articulating the mutually constitutive relationship between capitalism and the ongoing politics of empire, it’s very hard to perceive the truly global dimension of economic inequality. Moreover, the separation between what’s viewed as “domestic” and what’s viewed as “foreign” means that it’s equally difficult to recognize and develop solidarities between communities in the North and in the South or to appreciate how seemingly US-centered struggles may be only one piece of a broader global reality.

A key effect is the decline of a self-conscious and committed internationalist sensibility among economic reformers in the US. Thinking of inequality in isolation from colonialism or from exercises of American hegemony essentially leaves uncontested the security ends of the US state, ends that feed back in direct and indirect ways precisely into sustaining corporate power and class hierarchies at home.

It should be noted that during the heyday of the labor movement or of black radicalism, activists very clearly articulated an independent foreign policy grounded above all in the interests of oppressed communities — one that emphasized solidarities abroad (between workers or colonized peoples) and that directly challenged the security state itself. Nothing like this exists at present, and I can’t help but think that one reason is the discursive disconnect between questions of economy on the one hand and those of race, empire, and hegemony on the other.

The second reason for bringing the legacies of settler empire back into our discussions of capitalism has to do with specifically American roadblocks to social democracy. Thomas Piketty notes that the United States in the nineteenth century was marked by far greater white economic equality than European counterparts. But he spends less time on the essentially colonial explanation for this fact.

Throughout American history, the tension between capitalism and both democratic self-government and economic independence has largely been resolved through native expropriation and/or racialized economic subordination. And many of the great American struggles to replace capitalism with a more humane political economy have foundered precisely on questions of membership.

For example, radicals during Reconstruction, the Populist movement, the New Deal, and the long black freedom struggle all emphasized the need to pursue policies that made economic justice both universal and effective. Yet all faced powerful counterforces that defined membership narrowly and reverted to colonial dichotomies of insiders and outsiders, in the process breaking class solidarities and preserving racial and economic privileges. To return to immigration, today we can see this dynamic playing out once more in the context of debates around the legal rights and status of undocumented workers.

To make matters worse, a common American narrative has been to blame oppressed communities for the collapse of “universal” economic agendas. The conventional story of the 1960s instructs us that it is black radicals at the close of the decade that were not universalistic enough — despite the fact that they maintained a persistent and thoroughgoing critique of capitalism — and thus scared away potential white allies, fatally compromising left-liberal change. This blame narrative suggests just how pernicious race in particular and colonial legacies more generally have been for fulfilling social democratic goals.

The politics of exclusion has been a persistent means of cleaving class solidarities and undermining direct confrontation with the prevailing economic order. The collapse of these solidarities has then been blamed on the very radicals — particularly within excluded communities — that were at the forefront of pressing for universal and revolutionary reform in the first place.

The only way that these cycles of retrenchment and blame can be broken in the United States is by fully integrating our conversations about class and race, capitalism and colonialism.

#### Structural theories collapse from internal contradictions, attempts to remedy produce a *degenerative research program.*

Svirsky and Arie, PhDs, 18

(Marcelo, Politics@WollongAustralia, and Ronnen Ben, postdoctoral fellow at the Minerva Center for the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions., From Shared Life To Co-Resistance in Historic Palestine)

According to Veracini, if ‘there is a plot in the “historiography of elimination” and more generally in settler-colonial studies it is that while the structure attempts to eliminate Indigenous peoples it fails to do so’, or in other words, ‘the structure cannot be reduced to its intention’.33 That is to say, Wolfe’s logic of elimination should not be equated with elimination itself. As Veracini explains: Far from equating settler colonialism with elimination, Wolfe’s ‘structure’ refers to a continuing relationship of inequality between Indigenous and settler collectives. Beside ‘structure’ and ‘event’, it seems important to note that Wolfe refers to a logic of elimination, not to elimination itself. After all, were Indigenous elimination to become an accomplished and irretrievable fact, settler colonialism would lose its logic.34 While the key for Wolfe is to shed light on the mechanisms of elimination, Veracini opens the door to research into what the structure actualising the logic fails to accomplish. Intent after all, speaks of a dynamic of success and failure. Logically as well as empirically, if structures fail to accomplish their objectives, thus the notion of the structure needs to be thought as a formation traversed by disagreeing forces impairing its missions, alongside an assessment of the degree of consistency this formation has achieved. It is wrong then to assume that the forces responsible for the formation of the settler structure are to be sought in a uniform, unidirectional and one-sided series of power strategies conceived as always already signifying domination. In other words, settler inscription and determinations do not operate in free-floating spaces; thus it makes little sense to analyse them in isolation from the oppositional forces that in their action ignore, slow down, impede or distract settler progress. Therefore, we suggest defining the structure of invasion in terms of the variances between changing compositions of forces, those seeking to eliminate Indigenous life and the forces causing some of these attempts to fail, hence compelling the settler colonial regime to address what escapes it and rework itself.35 Historically, these dialectics lead to incompleteness, but incompleteness is how dialectical contents are transcended. The reproductive aspiration of any structure is dependent on its capabilities to properly manage escapes. While structuralism would favour the comprehension of what binds the structure, a post-structuralist analysis cannot do without adopting the same introspection but from the viewpoint of what escapes it. Therefore, the significant questions for us concern how an emergent formation internalises adverse rationalities to make them its own limits, where and how a structure is forced to bifurcate, where old determinacies lose their consistency and endurance such that they have to be replaced or changed, and most importantly for our case study, how this knowledge assists the decomposition of the structure. It is a mistake then to invoke the term structure to imply a perfectly structured thing or ‘the earth’s last word’.36 Veracini captured this dynamism of the settler colonial situation by describing it in terms of a ‘permanent movement’.37 It is time to call a spade a spade: resistance is the general name for the forces challenging the settler forces of elimination. Elimination and resistance shape each other; each responds to the other. Both become defined in an ever-changing dialectical relation, where dialectics are motioned, pushed towards new directions, by overflows. At any point in time, the vicissitudes of elimination are the vicissitudes of the struggle over the formation of the settler society or, as Veracini recently put it: the ‘settler colonial present is also an indigenous one’. Therefore, unless we ascribe to the academic obsession with the agents of oppression as omnipresent so popular these days, the incompleteness of elimination cannot be explained just in terms of the oppressor’s self-error or strategic deferment. It is the empirical interaction between opposite forces that create incompleteness. Tracing the paths and operations of the myriad of social forces that in the first instance bring settlers to plan, invent, react and rethink their practices of appropriation appears as methodologically necessary. Or to phrase the same thing from the other end, it makes no sense to evaluate the forces of life without accounting for those seeking to destroy it. In sum, it is imperative to account for the struggle that have made settler destruction an incomplete project. As Macoun and Strakosch note, ‘Exposing the settler colonial project as fundamentally incomplete – and unable to be completed in the face of Indigenous resistance – has the potential to be a profoundly liberating and destabilizing move’.39 Incompleteness is the symptom of resistance. Put otherwise, to eradicate incompleteness and resistance from the analysis of the systematicity of the emerging settler structure is in more ways than one to force an account that erases the native one more time, this time permanently. In such retrospective accounts, Althusser claimed, ‘Everything is accomplished in advance; the structure precedes its elements and reproduces them in order to reproduce the structure’.40 Where native resistance is excluded from the analysis of native elimination, as Rana Barakat has recently explained, The hegemonic presence of the settler on the land is mirrored as a hegemony embedded within the primary placement of the settler in scholarly literature. Like the attempted erasure of the indigenous presence on the land, this settler dominated framework in the scholarship is the attempted devaluation and eventual erasure of the Native history of and presence on the land.41 Much has been written on Patrick Wolfe’s rejection of resistance as a category of analysis in settler colonial theory. In the very last page of Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Wolfe writes: ‘What needs to be written in is not the agency of the colonised but the total context of inscription’;42 that is, the Wolfean paradigm opted to funnel research to study ‘the settler-colonial will, a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion’.43 In such a view, two separate lines of inquiry are presented: the study of settler colonial domination and the study of Indigenous discourse and resistance – the second being ‘peripheral’ as Wolfe states – to the analysis of the first.44 As Wolfe adds, It is important to keep the two perspectives separate. As stated, my purpose is to categorize colonizing strategies employed in Australia. It is not to categorize Indigenous strategies of resistance, survival or anything else. The failure to distinguish between the two perspectives recapitulates assimilationism. 45 To properly understand Wolfe’s methodological strategy, we should take seriously his use of the first-person singular as his subjective coordinates in the settler project. Wolfe is proposing a research agenda that counters the historical complicity of white settler academics in the making and maintenance of (Indigenous) elimination. In this reading, by engaging in acts of representation of Indigenous discourses and experiences (resistance included), white academics reproduce settler invasion: Nothing can escape being turned into a text for the analyst to appropriate, interrogate and reconstruct. [. . .] The outcome is an ethnographic ventriloquism whereby invaded subjects are made to speak unawares, in contexts in which they could reasonably believe they were doing something else.46 Wolfe’s methodological preference rightly rests on undeniable historical grounds: in settler societies there can be no innocent academic discourses about Indigenous knowledge and experiences.47 For all its historical complicity, the white settler academy is always already suspicious, since, as, for instance, in the Australian case, ‘the significance of anthropology is that it has provided – though not exclusively – narratives that have been selected in furtherance of the logic of elimination’.48 As Wolfe explains: Claims to authority over indigenous discourse made from within the settlercolonial academy necessarily participate in the continuing usurpation of indigenous space (invasion is a structure not an event). This theoretical conclusion is abundantly borne out by the Australian academy’s deep involvement in successive modalities of settler-colonial discourse. Whether by accident or design, whether by measuring, quantifying, pathologizing, expunging or essentializing, a comprehensive range of authorities – anthropologists in particular, but also historians, biologists, archaeologists, psychologists, criminologists, the whole Foucauldian line-up – have produced an incessant flow of knowledge about Aborigines that has become available for selective appropriation to warrant, to rationalize and to authenticate official definitions, policies and programmes for dealing with ‘the Aboriginal problem’.49 Similarly, reflecting on the role of Israeli historians in the production of knowledge justifying the Zionist settler colonial project, Ilan Pappé similarly commented: Rather than setting out to validate grand claims such as a persistent, age-old Jewish urge to settle in Palestine or the emptiness of Palestine prior to the arrival of the Zionists, they sliced up these claims by time frame or topic and provided limited empirical evidence for their validity. Thus they would look at Jewish urges for Palestine during a particular decade or discuss conditions in Palestine during a particular year or season. But whether they reconstructed the historical process as a whole, or focused on a single anecdotal chapter within it, they remained loyal both to Zionism and to scientific truth, as they saw it.50 Undoubtedly, the question of positionality justly troubles choices and roles in the study of settler colonialism. But it is not only, as Merlan pointed out, that Wolfe escalated the ban on ‘speaking for’ into one of ‘speaking about’ Indigenous people and resistance; it is just that it makes no sense to write in the settler context of inscription, to use Wolfe’s words, and pretend that Indigenous knowledge, perceptions and experiences are not affected.51 However, as a trace of history, as Wolfe conceived it in his last book, race unavoidably infiltrates and shapes contemporary critical engagements with colonialism, and as a corollary, Wolfe proposed a form of research collaboration or division, where Indigenous scholarship emerges as the sole legitimate source of knowledge of Indigenous strategies of resistance and survival, while white academics are left with one and only one untainted avenue of research to follow; that is, engaging in critical white auto-ethnographies.52 Just recently, Barakat suggested a disciplinary division of this sort, but in distinction to Wolfe who denounced settler’s representations/appropriations of the native in academic work, Barakat criticises the settler colonial paradigm for ignoring the native in so doing giving the whole focus to settlers’ adventures. So Barakat asks, ‘How can a settler colonial studies analysis contribute to an Indigenous analysis while not becoming the central focus of the narrative?’53 Though it preserves the racial division of labour, Barakat’s answer is interesting and worth considering: ‘Scholars can use settler colonialism as a useful method of analysis within the larger project of Indigenous studies’.54 One way or another, the division of academic labour runs the risk of echoing – rather than combatting – the segregative effects of the empirical divisions that exist. It also takes us directly into the dimensions of the anticolonial struggle, and forces us to ask who is entitled to participate in the struggle, under what conditions and in which actions. Wolfe’s division of academic labour is not the answer we embrace. As Macoun and Strakosch observed, settler colonial studies ‘explains more of who we are than previous approaches, but it is not coincident with all that we are, and is not able to explain the entire encounter between Indigenous and settler peoples’.55 In addition, as Behar states for Mizrahi literature, ‘while ethnic, gender, or racial origins of authors are undeniably indispensable for making full sense of literary development generally . . . they should be considered of secondary ontological status vis-à-vis the content of texts’.56 That is, in transcending the given, subjectivity is not trumped by positionality. Wolfe’s early position on the issue of resistance, we suspect, encompassed more preoccupations than how to respond to the white appropriation of Indigenous discourses and experiences. According to Wolfe, ‘Indigenous resistance has been a constant feature of the entire settler-colonial era’, and therefore, ‘in generating its own resistance, settler-colonial power also contains it’.57 For Wolfe, in responding to the constraints of power, resistance is always quickly reappropriated. But in adopting this conception, we risk conceiving no outside to settler colonial power. Thus, oppression and domination in all their forms and shapes are given explanatory monopoly thus replicating their omnipresence in the shaping and managing of life. (13-18)

# 2NC – K

#### Appeal to epistemic blackness and indigeneity essentializes biological and cultural characteristics.

Christopher **MURRAY** PhD Candidate IR LSE **’20** *Anti-imperial world politics: race, class, and internationalism in the making of post-colonial order* p. 63-65

Claims that non-European societies were capable of outpacing Europeans at various modern practices involved forms of self-essentialism. For example, some argued that colonised populations had the potential to surpass Europeans because they had developed a higher stage of modernity through their unique social and historical experience. In an early essay, The Case for West Indian Self-Government, C.L.R. James wrote The bulk of the population of these West Indian islands, over eighty per cent [sic], consists of Negroes or persons of Negroid origin. They are the descendants of those African slaves who were brought almost continuously to the West Indies until the slave trade was stopped in 1807. Cut off from all contact with Africa for a century and a quarter, they present today the extraordinary spectacle of a people who, in language and social customs, religion, education and outlook are essentially Western and, indeed, far more advanced in Western culture than many a European community.169

While more sophisticated than biological explanations of ethnic and cultural otherness, sociohistorical development claims still attempted to code whole groups of people according to generic attributes. Thus self-representation was essentialism – even if ‘strategic essentialism.’170 Claims that colonised populations had/have the potential to become better democrats, liberals, socialists, etc. because of their unique historical experience often fail to account for the fact that such claims are elicited through a dialectical relationship between hegemon and counter-hegemon. This is reproduced in the work of some contemporary scholars who take theorists like Fanon primarily as a source of ‘epistemic blackness’, without fully addressing his concerns about essentialism. For example, the philosopher Lewis R. Gordon writes that ‘Fanon’s body… is a subtext of all his writings…. Anxiety over embodiment is a dimension of Western civilization against which Fanon was in constant battle. The body, he laments, is a denied presence, and black people are a denied people.171 Gordon thus associates black or colonised identity with a particular way of thinking. But for Fanon, colonised populations were not so much universally ‘denied’ as relegated to certain roles within a social hierarchy—the French empire most specifically. Natives could be higher or lower status, but racial and cultural hierarchy were the basis for social relegation which alienated the subject from a full, dynamic social existence. Fanon the dialectician characterised every particular experience is an instantiation of the universal, and his analysis of his own experience is a demand to be recognised as a fellow human with an equal stake in humanity, not as irreconcilably other. Blackness is not a generalisable perspective from which we can derive a radically different ‘non-Western knowledge’ singular, but a reminder to pay attention to the social and historical specificity of dialectical relation.172

### 2NC – M!

#### Burn it down is the logical product of starting with the socially dead – we perversely desire complete destruction given the injustice of the world. Abjection is not a good starting point for politics. Gratuitous freedom demands gratuitous violence.

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-presumption tht experience of abjection that is the dance with death – starting from – 1 authenticity test for ptx = experience of utter dereliction – a liberal subject one that is utterly autonomy – b bc that exp of abjection is associated with wisdom as a political standpoint that lets you understand modernity then for the sake of anticolonial ptix it licenses any level of violence vs those who oppose and destructs all that is tied to modernity which is everything – bc this is what happened to me this is what should happen to all others = grat violence – obce you k notions of redemption so thoroughly then you can never return to a principle of restorative justice but one of reciprocal punishment – which is why we should look to disavowal instead – hr was always already modern but disavowed bc of how history disavowed it as part of modern political imaginary – unpacking that process of disavowal allows you to see some subjects of black freedom as expressing some components of a modern political imaginary instead of just subjects of a pure sa

"This raw, free, and vulnerable state"

There is another aspect to Buck-Morss's argument that I find more difticult, and this has to do with the subjective dimension of the essay. Let me cite one of the key passages at some length here:

The definition of universal history that begins to emerge here Is this: . . . human universality emerges in the historical event at the point of rupture. It is in the discontinuities of history that people whose culture has been strained to the breaking point give expression to a humanity that goes beyond cultural limits. And it is in our empathetic identification with this raw, free, and vulnerable state, that we have a chance of understanding what they say. Common humanity exists in spite of culture and its differences. A person's non-identity with the collective allows for subterranean solidarities that have a chance of appealing to universal, moral sentiment, the source today of enthusiasm and hope. It is not through culture, but through the threat of i culture's betrayal that consciousness of a common humanity comes to be. (133)

At first sight, this passage is simply as a response to the pieties of a multicultural politics of recognition: culture divides us, and when absolutist claims are made in the name of culture, all is lost. "Osama bin Laden meets Jean-Jacques Dessalines, and Vladimir Lenin meets George W. Bush" (143). Perhaps. But Buck-Morss's argument actually tries to provide us with an alternative. Discussing the controversial issue of the survival of African belief and ritual in New World slavery cultures, she says, "I do not mean to imply that in the New World nothing remained of the original intent [of African religious and social elements]. But it is inconceivable, from a human point of view, that these brutally enslaved and expatriated persons carried their rituals and gods with them in slave-ship holds like so much checked baggage" (128-29).

Now, I think we have good reasons to think, for instance, that Vodou is a profoundly modern ritual, a thorough reworking of African belief and ritual under the pressures of slavery and forced Christianization. I think Buck-Morss is quite right when she insists that a profound change in meaning took place when elements of African religions and social life were reemployed in the context of the slave plantation. But it is one thing to recognize the rupture of the Middle Passage and the radically syncretic nature of the cultures that developed on the other side of the Atlantic, and another to imagine humans as blank slates. Do we ever really encounter a human being in a state that could be described as "raw, free, and vulnerable"? Is this image of a human evacuated of all cultural meaning and stripped of all social ties not rather always a metaphysical fantasy? Like primitive accumuiation in Marx's thought, the raw subject needs to be assumed for theoretical reasons, but cannot actually be seen. Cultural rupture is a systemic event, something that affects culture over time. There are striking resonances here with the imaginary subject of classical liberalism: an abstract human subject, unmarked by gender, race, and culture, which then becomes the subject of certain entitlements.

There are other considerations. Assuming that the brutality of slave transportation and plantation labor did indeed wrest humans out of their social and cultural networks in this most radical sense, can we really call that person free? Again, one might say, there are resonances of classical liberalism here. What kind of concept of freedom would this radical uprooting generate? Is it really a freedom that can become the foundation of a universal history? We might recall here Hannah Arendt's powerful analysis of the predicament of Jews in Nazi Germany. Why did the German state bother to strip Jews of their citizenship before hoarding them into camps? Arendt's answer is profoundly pessimistic: when the people of Europe encountered those miserable beings who had indeed "lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except that they were still human," they "found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human."^ German authorities clearly assumed, rightly, that abjectness did not necessarily produce empathy.

There is a deeply troubling, though rarely discussed, moment in John Locke's Second Treatise of Government that is particularly pertinent here, as it provides us with an example of how slavery functions within a foundational account of inalienable human liberty. Having introduced the conventional argument that prisoners taken in a just war can be enslaved because they have "forfeited" their lives (a tale Locke knew did not correspond to the reality of the Atlantic slave trade),^ he continues as follows: "Having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society... ; and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force . . . to be his rule of right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of mankind, . . . as any other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor security."^" What is remarkable here is not that Locke, the theorist of liberty, justifies slavery. Practically all natural lawyers before him did so. Rather, it is the tinge of what Lacan called jouissance, an almost gleeful fantasy of legitimate cruelty that follows once the human being has been stripped of all his or her human bonds. There was no need for Locke to engage in sadistic fantasy. His argument did not require it, and predecessors such as Grotius or Suarez did not do this. But neither did they insist that the enslaved had to loose all social and cultural ties. It seems as if the fantasy of the loss of all human ties—this "abstract nakedness of being human"—opens a space where we can imagine the unimaginable.

Why Haiti?

There is another way of thinking about this issue, and after the catastrophe of 12 January it became impossible for me to set this worry aside. True, Buck-Morss's book is a brilliant attempt to wrest universal freedom from history's catastrophes and to ground the experience of common humanity and liberty in the experience of the enslaved. But this freedom somehow requires that our cultures be "pulverized," as Buck-Morss, citing Alfred Métraux, says about the slaves brought from Africa to the New World (126): Could our empathy with those who have suffered historic catastrophe not also turn into to a certain perverse desire for destruction and loss? Can we desire universal history but not the destruction it is predicated on? What if the experience of catastrophe makes us merely numb and unable to comprehend? Does violence, once removed from politics and our narratives of liberation, reproduce itself on the level of psychical investment?

### AT Perm

#### We offer competing problem-spaces – the frame used to present the problem of imperialism sets the limits on possible alternatives.

Christopher **MURRAY** PhD Candidate IR LSE **’20** *Anti-imperial world politics: race, class, and internationalism in the making of post-colonial order* p. 21-23

Anti-imperialists saw ethnic and cultural difference – and used difference claims – as variable and often ambiguous tools of political strategy. By this I do not mean that anti-imperialists had a free choice of a ‘menu’ of possibilities. As Meera Sabaratnam writes, recognizing ‘decolonial’ theory as strategy means we acknowledge that ‘the philosophical wagers and commitments made are located in and directed towards a particular problem, and express different interests.’28 Discourse about the world and for world change is necessarily situated in a specific set of historical presumptions and partisan loyalties: ‘problem-spaces’ in which a limited set of questions and answers can come to prominence.29 The strategies of those who wanted exit were shaped in part by those who expressed voice or loyalty. Because difference and authenticity politics could also act as a debilitating legacies of colonial divide and rule, part of the struggle to transform world order from below necessarily entailed the transcendence of difference in order to build revolutionary coalitions, and disable the hierarchal divisions which sustained imperialism.

Recent IR studies have retrained focus on ethnic and cultural difference and diversity, both as ontological features of society and as political referents. This study contributes to this emerging literature by highlighting: connections between ‘global’ imperial orders and ‘particular’ social genesis; the importance of an international social imaginary of ‘world races’ before and after WWII30; and the plurality of power relations and knowledge formations between and within racialised groups. As we will see, political discourse often conflates racial and cultural difference.31 ‘Blackness’ in anti-imperial discourse was not conceptualised purely in terms of physical traits, but ascribed a host of cultural characteristics.

Questions about difference and diversity are raised to critique the totalising and homogenising tendencies of Realism, Liberalism, or modernisation theories more broadly.32 I concur with the argument that international theory needs to cast a wider net, and open its analytic scope to account for global processes and inequalities, subaltern politics, and inter-societal connections. However, some anti-Eurocentric IR carries a danger of reifying ‘non-Western difference’ by ascribing to it a geography and an essence. Take for example ‘Global IR’, which has come to stand in as the latest iteration of this longstanding debate. In his 2014 declaration of Global IR’s new agenda to the International Studies Association, Amitav Acharya accepts Stanley Hoffmann’s account of IR as ‘born and raised in America’, but adds that the discipline has now ‘mushroomed’ through ‘schools, departments, institutes, and conventions’ around the world.33 He argues that this new state of affairs presents an opportunity to open IR to the rest of the world; to push for ‘greater inclusiveness and diversity’, and to address the widely acknowledged problem of the discipline’s empirical focus and ‘main theories’ being ‘too deeply rooted in, and beholden to, the history, intellectual traditions, and agency claims of the West.’34

Such a conception reproduces, what I call, epistemic mapping: the notion that knowledge has a single or rightful geographic provenance, that it is owned by a single race, culture, nation, or region. Similarly ‘decolonial’ scholars, often drawing on the work of Enrique Dussel or Walter Mignolo, characterise modernity as a bifurcated process in which ‘epistemologies of the South’ have been systematically disenfranchised, excluded, or eradicated according to the racial chauvinism inherent to Western thought systems.35 Some writing in this register argue for the need to seek out ‘places of otherness’, to borrow a phrase from Gyan Prakash, as a resource from which to contest the fundamental assumptions of hegemonic liberal politics and nationalist historiography, which are characterised as essentially Western.36 Similar to Global IR, there is a danger of reproducing essential and stereotypical definitions of human difference in promoting a Western universalism/non-Western authenticity binary. Strategic essentialism has long been a feature of political discourse; it can serve progressive or conservative ends, as well as have unintended consequences. The role of the scholar should not be to do strategic essentialism ourselves, but to better understand how it becomes possible, and/or to assess its aims and outcomes.